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ABSTRACT
Fractional Reserve Banking: The Genesis of Macro-Instability 
Koch, John Nicholas, M.A. University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 
1992. 93pp. Major Professor: Murray N. Rothbard.
This thesis is a theoretical criticism of fractional reserve 
banking. The Austrian school (especially the works of 
Mises, Hayek and Rothbard), consider credit expansion to be 
the genesis of macro-economic instability.
This study applies Austrian interest, capital and business 
cycle theory to challenge the widely held assumption that 
our present economic system is fundamentally sound. Using a 
theoretical construct known as the "Angel Gabriel Model", 
the devastating consequences of continuing credit expansion 
are explored. Fractional reserve free banking is also 
considered within this model and found to be an 
unsatisfactory option when compared to 100 percent reserve 
banking. In conclusion, policy proposals and system 
transition are considered in the event of a general economic 
collapse.
(§> 1992 John Koch 
All Rights Reserved
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11. Introduction
We are living in a unique period of history. Since the 
final collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971, no 
currency in the world has maintained even the most tenuous 
ties to gold. The present financial system is relatively 
new, yet most mainstream economists assume that (given 
proper fiscal and monetary management) it is viable and able 
to cope with a changing and vibrant economy. The purpose of 
this thesis will be to challenge that assumption.
Much of what is considered macro instability is, in essence, 
a market response to fractional reserve banking. 
Historically, the market has ultimately reacted violently to 
fractional reserve banking. Bank runs, stock market 
crashes, the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and other 
financial phenomena tend to occur in a panic. Government 
orchestrated, fractional reserve credit expansion has always 
led to crisis and collapse, except under the present system. 
It may be too soon to evaluate, however. Judging from the 
way the market has responded in the past, is it not possible 
that the market may respond in an equally violent manner, 
which has not been seen because of the relatively short and 
peculiar nature of this particular period? This is the 
primary question that this thesis will explore.
2I will begin by establishing grounds for questioning the 
long term viability of any fractional reserve system, and 
continue with a brief historical review to illustrate that 
there has never been such a system that has operated for 
very long without periodic crises that are more severe the 
longer the duration of the credit expansion. Because 
fractional reserve banking limits credit expansion to a 
greater degree, it is preferable to government sponsored 
banking, however, 100 percent reserve banking is far 
superior to both. I will discuss reasons why a more severe 
market response to credit expansion has not already occurred 
and conclude Part One by exploring the logical contra­
dictions upon which any fractional reserve system is based. 
In Part Two, using a theoretical construct familiar to 
Austrian economists known as the "Angel Gabriel" model, I 
will attempt to illustrate the inevitable consequences of 
sustained and systematic, long term expansion of credit.
Part Three will discuss an area of much recent interest: 
fractional reserve free banking. I will question the basic 
assumptions upon which fractional reserve free banking is 
based and also the historical record. It is important to 
show that 100 percent reserve banking is superior to 
fractional reserve free banking, for if it were to be 
implemented, its disruptive effects would be seen as an
3indictment of the free market and not the inevitable 
consequences of a fundamentally flawed system.
In conclusion, I will explore the implications of a collapse 
of fractional reserve and some of the ramifications of this 
assertion. Throughout this thesis, I will be drawing 
heavily upon interest, capital and business cycle theory as 
developed by the Austrian school, especially Mises, Hayek, 
and Rothbard.[1] Even though most Austrian business cycle 
theory presumes some form of gold standard,[2] much of the 
analysis can be applied to our present system.
4PART ONE
FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING
2. Grounds for Questioning the Long Term Viability of 
Fractional Reserve
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and question the 
long term viability of any financial system based upon 
government controlled fractional reserve banking. Many 
questions immediately come to mind but among the foremost 
might be, "If any credit expansion is not viable in the long 
run, why hasn't the present system already collapsed?"
It is true that in the almost sixty years since the United 
States began to disengage the dollar from gold the banking 
system has almost always operated on some form of fractional 
reserve. There have been recurrent recessions and stock 
market crashes, yet no general collapse. The majority of 
mainstream economists are confident that existing policy 
tools can prevent such a collapse, yet the 1987 stock market 
crash may give rise to question that belief. Although a 
variety of explanations as to the cause of the crash have 
been offered, all fall short except for one. As Rothbard 
writes,
To put it simply; the reason for the crash was the 
credit boom generated by the double-digit monetary 
expansion engineered by the Fed in the last several 
years.[3]
Although there have been several such sharp downturns since 
the Great Depression, nothing has approached its severity 
and duration. Even many economists critical of mainstream 
economics feel that the system can stumble on indefinitely; 
that there is nothing inherent in the system that must lead 
to its inevitable collapse as long as people are willing to 
accept occasional economic downturns. Yet, because few 
question its soundness does not mean that there might not be 
a serious problem. It may be useful to examine how the 
market has responded to credit expansion in the past.
3. The Market's Historical Response to Fractional Reserve 
Systems.
Historically, the market has always reacted violently to 
credit expansion. Although the credit expansion may have 
been gradual, the inevitable response was rapid. The price- 
specie-flow mechanism identified by David Hume, although not 
applied to fractional reserve banking until the early 19th 
century, demonstrated how the market responds to inflation. 
When one nation increases its currency more rapidly than 
others, price inflation is a result. As domestic prices 
rise relative to imports, individuals spend more on imports 
and less on domestic products. As foreign suppliers redeem 
the inflated currency for gold, a gold drain begins from the 
inflating nation. The gold reserves upon which the currency
6is based begin to erode and the inflating nation must 
contract its supply of currency or its banks will collapse, 
and this contraction has always occurred in a panic.
The Bretton Woods System was also a victim of the market's
inexorable response to a fractional reserve system. Under
the Bretton Woods agreement, the United States was bound by
law to redeem in gold all dollars held by foreign central
banks. As the United States continued to inflate throughout
the 1950s and 1960s, dollars piled up in Central Banks
overseas until market pressures could not be held off any
longer. Europeans realized that dollars were no longer
worth 1/35 of an ounce of gold and desired to redeem their
dollars in what amounted to a classic Gresham's Law
situation. The Bretton Woods System collapsed on August 15,
1971, in what might be viewed as a "bank run". The
depositors who wished (and were entitled by law) to redeem
their dollars were foreign central banks while the banker
who defaulted was the central bank of the United States.
The world entered a unique period in history, for this was
the first time that not a single currency in the world could
be redeemed in gold in any form. As Dr. Rothbard writes,
For the first time in American history, the dollar 
was totally fiat, totally without backing in gold. 
Even the tenuous link with gold maintained since 
1933 was now severed.[4]
7Because the gold standard provides an effective check to 
unlimited credit expansion, many economists proposed that 
eliminating the gold standard might also circumvent the 
inevitable market response. It is, however, extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to avoid market response in 
the long run. Many might say the market is "invincible" and 
any attempts to manipulate it in any area only leads to 
crisis, failure, or a drastic reduction in the standard of 
living. The collapse of Bretton Woods, the price-specie- 
flow mechanism, and recessions are all market responses to 
credit expansion. Much of what is considered "mainstream 
macro policy" is an attempt to circumvent such responses.
It is true that we no longer have a gold standard to check 
credit expansion but might not the market have a new, and as 
yet unseen reaction to our present system, given that it is 
not quite twenty years old? Both Mises and Rothbard have 
written about the "Runaway Boom" [5] as the ultimate check 
on inflation but how does this mechanism work? Does it 
occur as a result of government greed and mismanagement or 
is there a fundamental flaw due to the logical contra­
dictions inherent in any fractional reserve system?
If there is indeed a fundamental flaw to this system, one 
would have expected certain events to occur before any major 
crisis. One is the collapse of Bretton Woods. According to 
the Austrian theory of the business cycle, it is the
8cessation of, or decrease in, the rate of inflation that 
ushers in the end of the boom. The Austrian theory stands 
alone in identifying the inevitable "bust" as a result of 
the previous "boom". Most of the theoretical work done on 
the Austrian theory, however, assumes some form of gold 
standard. Any gold standard will eventually force the 
cessation of credit expansion if the government wishes to 
defend the gold standard. But what happens when the 
government abandons the gold standard (as Nixon abandoned 
Bretton Woods) and yet continues to expand credit? Has the 
market been circumvented?
In 1971, the government faced only two options: either 
defend the Bretton Woods System or abandon it. It chose to 
abandon it. Any market response to continuing credit 
expansion (such as bank runs, monetary contractions or 
depressions) would have occurred after that point. Since 
previous market responses occurred in roughly ten year 
intervals, isn't it possible that the market may have a new 
but similar response that will not be seen for 25 to 30 
years - or possibly even longer? Can we expect a continuing 
string of boom periods followed by sometimes sharp but 
manageable recessions or can we expect a rapid and general 
collapse and cessation of credit expansion as in the past?
Is the Savings and Loan crisis an expansion of a fundamental 
problem or a one time aberration that can be corrected?
These are the questions this thesis will be dealing with. I 
hope to establish enough evidence to at least question the 
belief that the present system is fundamentally sound. It 
may be useful to discuss some reasons why the market may not 
have already responded to this continuing and unchecked 
credit expansion.
4. Possible Factors Delaying a Severe Market Response to 
Unlimited Credit Expansion.
The end of World War II left the United States as the
dominant economic, military, and political power. Most of
Europe and Japan could only be rebuilt, at least initially,
with American products. The Marshall Plan authorized
billions of dollars in aid so that those products could be
purchased. The Bretton Woods System established the dollar
as the primary reserve currency for most of the world’s
central banks. Consequently, the demand for the dollar
tremendously increased and the United States was able to
increase the supply of the dollar without enduring a
decrease in the nominal value of the dollar. The increased
demand for the dollar lasted well into the sixties when the
European and Japanese recovery was almost complete and
foreign central banks began to build up large dollar
reserves.
The effects of World War II and other offsetting factors 
were unique to the period and could not continue forever.
During the 1950s and 1960s West European countries reversed 
their previously inflationary policies and came increasingly 
under the influence of free market and hard money 
authorities many of whom had been influenced by Ludwig von 
Mises. Rothbard writes, "The United States soon became the 
most inflationist of the major powers. Hard money 
countries, such as West Germany, France and Switzerland, 
increasingly balked at accepting the importation of dollar 
inflation, and began to accelerate their demands for 
redemption in gold."[6] By the late sixties, the market's 
inexorable response to continued credit expansion resulted 
in the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement.
It can be argued that if certain events had not occurred, 
the system would not have collapsed, but this is missing the 
point. Even if the Bretton Woods crises had not occurred 
until several years later, and even if the United States had 
continued to increase the supply of dollars, Bretton Woods 
would still have been doomed. The important point to
remember is that it was a system that was not viable in the
long run and that, amazingly, lasted as long as it did. In
any credit expansion, there are events peculiar to that
historical period that can be pointed out as the event that 
forced the end of the credit expansion or in the case of 
Bretton Woods, forced the end of the system. But these are 
proximate causes and not the primary cause for collapse. If
11
the effects of these events could have been eliminated, the 
credit expansion might have continued for a time, but 
eventually the pressure to stop the inflation 
would have become overwhelming.
There are also other reasons why we might not have seen how 
the market reacts under a pure fiat system. According to 
the Austrian theory of the business cycle, the adverse 
effects of the previous credit expansion will not be felt 
until inflation, or the rate of inflation, has been reduced. 
This point cannot be accurately predicted because the crisis 
can always be pushed a little further into the future with 
an injection of credit. At the heart of the Austrian Theory 
is the idea that credit expansion causes an intertemporal 
dislocation. This will inexorably result in the market 
attempting to readjust. What many mainstream economists see 
as recession or depression is just the market attempting to 
readjust and return to the old capital/consumption ratios 
that existed before the credit expansion. Because capital 
prices rise relative to consumer prices during the boom, 
they also fall relative to consumer prices during the bust. 
We have already seen a substantial fall in the real estate 
market over the past few years.
In recent years, foreign investment in the United States has 
increased dramatically. Real estate and stock prices have
12
risen over the past decade as a result of credit expansion 
and new foreign investment. This has kept the value of the 
dollar relatively strong and U.S. capital markets fairly 
firm. The trend has been for U.S. consumers to buy foreign 
consumer goods and for foreign suppliers to purchase U.S. 
capital and debt. The Federal government makes a tremendous 
demand upon credit markets but this has been roughly offset 
by foreigners willingly supplying more credit. This trend 
cannot continue forever because interest rates cannot remain 
artificially high in the U.S. relative to the rest of the 
world. Market forces tend to make real rates of interest 
the same in all nation. U.S. Government borrowing has 
pushed interest rates up but this cannot continue 
indefinitely without bankrupting the U.S. When this trend 
reverses itself, capital values will have lost one of the 
key factors maintaining support. The value of capital goods 
will fall relative to consumer goods. This may be the 
signal that the market is finally responding to the previous 
credit expansions. The government may be faced with two 
choices: continue inflating at an accelerating rate or 
convert to a more rational and viable system.
5. The Illogical Foundation of Fractional Reserve
Characteristics Unique to Fractional Reserve
A distinguishing characteristic of fractional reserve
13
systems is that two parties have full and exclusive 
ownership of the same asset over the same time period. When 
one deposits funds in a fractional reserve institution, and 
those funds are in turn loaned to a third party, a unique 
situation arises which cannot be found in any form. In 
other enterprises, only one party owns assets at any 
particular point in time. Transferral of ownership is 
precisely defined. In fractional reserve, however, when a 
bank extends a loan, it allows the debtor virtual ownership 
of those funds for the duration of the loan as long as he 
meets the terms. These same funds, however, are supposedly 
available on demand to the original depositor. This is, in 
fact, the genesis of bank runs, for when two parties retain 
full and exclusive ownership of the same asset during the 
same time period, whoever first takes possession of that 
asset retains possession, leaving no legal recourse to the 
other owner.
The law has attempted to circumvent this logical 
contradiction by ruling that fractional reserve deposits are 
not the legal property of the depositor but, "a loan", which 
the debtor (fractional reserve institutions) must repay on 
demand. [7] The essential point, however, that must be 
remembered is that individuals act "as if" their deposits at 
fractional reserve institutions were their property and not 
an investment. Indeed, most depositors would be shocked to
14
discover otherwise. Other forms of fractional reserve such 
as ponzi schemes or grain elevators issuing unbacked 
warehouse receipts, have been codified into law as fraud.
Our present system also gives rise to the peculiar situation 
where the marginal costs of producing a good (debt) are 
lower for one producer (the government) than any of its 
competitors. In fact, government costs of creating debt 
through the banking system are virtually nil, for the 
monetary base upon which the debt is pyramided is 
constituted out of thin air. In any other enterprise, there 
may be one producer whose marginal costs are lower than its 
competitors but none whose marginal costs are effectively 
zero. Indeed, if there were, he would produce to the point 
where his product practically became a free good. It is 
only because the government has chosen to limit its credit 
expansion to a certain extent that this has not occurred.
If government expanded production of debt to its limit drove 
and all other producers of debt off the market, then 
everyone except the government would be involved in the 
purchase of goods (only the government is investing or 
producing) and this is nothing more than an extreme case of 
hyperinflation. Also, in any other example, the production 
of good implies the non-production of all other goods which 
might be created from the original inputs. This is not true 
of debt incurred through a fractional reserve system. Debt
15
established from other sources however, implies that there 
are investors who have decided to forego present consumption 
in favor of future consumption.
It is these logical contradictions which give rise to all 
the problems associated with fractional reserve and which 
will ultimately result in a future crisis.
Enterprises Commonly Mistaken as Forms of Fractional Reserve
To justify their support of fractional reserve, some 
theorists claim that it exists in many forms throughout the 
economy, not just in the financial world. They often cite 
bridges as an example of fractional reserve. Imagine a 
bridge which is constructed to meet the needs of a 
community. Normally, the bridge is large enough to handle 
any amount of traffic. If every member of the community 
attempts to cross at the same time, however, many members 
would be unable to cross. Theorists use this analogy to 
demonstrate that if all members of a fractional reserve bank 
were to withdraw their funds at the same time, the bank 
would be unable to provide sufficient liquidity to meet 
their needs. This supposedly is an example of a fractional 
reserve institution existing on the market.
16
I disagree with this conclusion. As was mentioned earlier, 
the essential aspect of any fractional reserve system is 
that more than one party has full and exclusive ownership of 
the same asset over the same period of time. If an 
individual built a bridge and sold shares promising the 
shareholders the right to cross the bridge at any time, and 
he oversold the number of shares to such an extent that not 
all shareholders were able to cross at the same time, he 
would be guilty of fraud. If the number of shares he sold 
was such that most shareholders could cross the bridge most 
of the time, and this was clearly understood by the 
shareholders, "most of the time" bridge-crossing shares 
would sell at a discount compared to "all of the time" 
bridge-crossing shares. Similarly, if fractional reserve 
banknotes operated on a "most of the time" redemption basis 
their notes would circulate at a discount compared to "all 
of the time" redemption of the one hundred percent reserve 
banks.
Rothbard destroys the "fractional reserve bridge" argument
when he writes,
But the most critical fallacy of this analogy 
is that the inhabitants do not then have a legal 
claim to cross the bridge at any time. (This would 
be even more evident if the bridge were owned by a 
private firm.) On the other hand, the holders of 
money substitutes most emphatically do have a legal 
claim to their own property at any time they choose 
to redeem it. The claims must then be fraudulent, 
since the bank could not possibly meet them all.
A bank that fails is therefore not simply an entre-
17
preneur whose forecasts have gone awry. It is a 
business whose betrayal of trust has finally been 
publicly revealed. [8]
Mark Skousen refers to yet another view of fractional
reserve,
And Charles A. Conant compares banknotes to the 
commodity futures market in justifying uncovered 
notes. They are "simply an engagement to deliver 
metallic money...In this respect it does not differ 
from an engagement to deliver wheat, except that the 
article promised is of more general acceptability... 
It is not necessary in either case that the signer of 
the engagement should possess the full amount of the 
commodity which he promises; it is only necessary 
that his reputation and other forms of property 
should inspire confidence in his ability to fulfill 
the promise.[9]
Conant fails, however, to realize the great differences
between the commodity futures market and a fractional
reserve system. In the first place, a commodity futures
contract is an agreement to deliver a specific quantity of a
commodity at a specific date in the future, not on demand as
is true of fractional reserve. Second, the production of a
commodity requires the employment of scarce resources that
could be employed producing other goods. The producer of a
commodity must choose among numerous possibilities available
and choose the one he feels will be in his best interest.
In other words, he must make a decision to forego all other
possible combinations. This is not true of the producer of
fractional reserve debt for it is created out of thin air,
and the producer foregoes nothing. Third, transferral of
ownership is precisely defined under a futures contract
where only one party maintains exclusive ownership at any
particular point in time, whereas fractional reserve funds 
are owned fully and exclusively by more than one party 
during the same time period.
While it may be true that a commodity contract may not be 
honored, just as a bank may be unable to honor its 
depositors claims during a bank run, the former is merely a 
broken promise, whereas the latter is afflicted by 
fundamental problems that make future payment of all claims 
impossible.
19
PART TWO
THE RETURN OF THE ANGEL GABRIEL
6. Angel Gabriel: Chairman of the Fed
I would like to borrow a theoretical construct that Dr. 
Rothbard effectively utilizes, known as the "Angel Gabriel 
Model", to illustrate the futility and disruptive effects of 
artificially increasing the money supply. The Angel 
Gabriel, looking down from above and feeling for the plight 
of humanity, overnight doubles the cash balances of every 
individual on earth. He feels this will make everyone on 
earth twice as well off. Money, however, is a peculiar 
commodity and, unlike almost everything else, an increase in 
its supply does not result in an increase in the general 
well being.[10] The first individuals to spend the new cash 
will be the ones to benefit, for a doubling of the money 
supply did not include a doubling of all goods and services 
in the economy. Prices will begin to rise and the last 
individuals to spend the new money will actually find 
themselves worse off. Not only has the Angel Gabriel failed 
to improve the lot of humanity, but relative prices have 
been disturbed, requiring an eventual adjustment. [11]
To illustrate my point, I would like to suppose that the 
Angel Gabriel has returned, but that now he is armed with a 
doctorate in mainstream economics and is confident that he 
can now rectify his past mistakes. He descends upon a small
20
nation by the name of Ruritania (again borrowing from Mises 
and Rothbard). In the Angel Gabriel's view, Ruritania is 
primitive in the areas of economics and banking. Ruritania 
maintains a one hundred percent gold standard, which means 
that its currency is redeemable on demand for a fixed weight 
of gold coin and its banking system operates on a one 
hundred percent reserve system. The Angel Gabriel convinces 
the Ruritanians that their system is hopelessly outdated and 
persuades them to establish a fractional reserve banking 
system, using fiat currency, insured by the federal 
government and manipulated by a Central Bank of which the 
Angel Gabriel is appointed chairman.
Figure One shows the situation in Ruritania prior to the 
Angel Gabriel's well-intentioned but misguided intervention. 
The graph shows the supply and demand of investment funds. 
The y axis indicates the interest rate and the x axis 
indicates the quantity of funds invested. I would like to 
assume for the duration of this example that time 
preferences remain constant. Consequently, the supply and 
demand curves for investment funds and the real interest 
rate remain constant since all are determined simultaneously 
by time preferences.[12] Ruritania is in a state of 
equilibrium.
21
NB indicates loanable funds generated from non-bank sources 
FR indicates loanable funds generated from fractional reserve sources
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Also, the entire supply of investment is extended by non- 
fractional reserve lenders or individuals. Investment 
undertaken by non-fractional reserve lenders or individuals 
can always be considered "one hundred percent reserve" since 
to invest upon which any other party has a legal claim is 
considered embezzlement. Non-fractional reserve investors 
must forego present consumption for investment which 
fractional reserve institutions do not.
The Angel Gabriel now embarks upon what many economists 
would consider an inspired and responsible program of 
systematic government engineered credit expansion. The 
Angel Gabriel accomplishes the initial increase in 
investment by lowering the reserve ration for fractional 
reserve institutions. He also plans to begin a program of 
government deficit spending and, after the reserve ratio has 
been sufficiently lowered, to manipulate the money supply 
through open market operations.
Prior to the appearance of the Angel, there were two types 
of banks operating in Ruritania: investment banks and 
deposit banks.[13] Investment banks accepted funds from 
individuals or institutions and invested them, sharing the 
eventual profits earned from those investments with the 
lenders. Those individuals did not have access to those 
funds until the loan matured or the loan was sold to another
24
lender such as the secondary loan market. Deposit banks 
allowed their depositors to withdraw their funds at any time 
but charged a fee for their services. The deposit banks in 
Ruritania are now allowed to operate on a fractional reserve 
system, offering withdrawal of funds on demand even though 
only a fraction of those funds are available at any time.
In Figure 2, the new supply curve is indicated by SI and the 
interest rate falls to II. The quantity of investment in 
the economy shifts from QO to Q1. The Angel Gabriel proudly 
informs the Ruritanians that investment will now be 
stimulated and the economy will never again have to suffer 
from a shortage of funds. Never again will the so-called 
"price level" be subject to wild swings even though the 
Ruritanians had never experienced such swings, only a 
history of gently falling prices. The quantity of 
investment in the economy is divided into that portion which 
is extended by fractional reserve institutions (indicated by 
FR) and that portion which is extended by non-fractional 
reserve lenders or individuals (indicated by NB).
The market will respond to this credit expansion. With the 
new interest rate at II, investors with time preferences at 
the margin will wish to withdraw their funds from investment 
and spend it on consumption. In Figure 3, Q0Q2 amount of
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investment will be removed from the market. At interest 
rate II, these investors would rather consume than invest.
It will take a certain period of time for this to be 
accomplished but the process will begin the moment the 
interest rate has been artificially lowered by credit 
expansion.
As these funds that had previously been invested are 
withdrawn and spent on consumption, the interest rate will 
begin to rise as the supply curve shifts to the left. 
Consequently, not the entire amount of Q0Q2 will be 
withdrawn from the market but only Q0Q4. The funds will be 
withdrawn entirely from non-fractional reserve sources and 
not from fractional reserve sources. For fractional reserve 
sources to withdraw any funds from the market would result 
in excess reserves and fractional reserve institutions when 
guaranteed by the federal government seldom hold excess 
reserves. They have no incentive to do so. The new supply 
curve would approach S2, where the supply of fractional 
reserve debt and the supply of debt extended by one hundred 
percent reserve institutions equilibrate.
In addition, if the new credit (Q0Q1) enters the economy 
through the credit markets, capital prices will be bid 
upward. Factors of production will be bid away from the
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consumer goods industries and employed in the capital goods 
industries. The original structure of relative prices has 
been distorted. This will inevitably result in a future 
correction, and it will be this correction that will prove 
to be the undoing of the good Angel's efforts.
It will now be apparent that the amount of debt Q3Q1 was 
extended below market rates. This debt was extended 
primarily by fractional reserve institutions since non- 
fractional reserve funds were leaving the market and 
fractional reserve funds were entering the market as the 
interest rate fell. There will be a tendency for all 
enterprises and all stages of production to return the same 
rate of profit.[14]
Any enterprise that consistently operates below the market 
rate of interest will eventually be abandoned. Because 
Ruritania was in equilibrium prior to the credit expansion, 
we can assume that all enterprises and stages of production 
returned the same rate of profit. The value of capital is 
also inversely related to the interest rate. Because the 
quantity of debt was extended at lower interest rates, when 
the value of capital was high, now that the interest rate 
has risen, the value of capital against which this 
investment was secured, will now have fallen. If non- 
fractional reserve institutions had extended this
investment, they would be forced to take a loss and recover 
what they could from the malinvestments. But these 
malinvestments were made primarily by fractional reserve 
institutions and because the government has guaranteed these 
malinvestments, the government will eventually be forced to 
purchase these losing enterprises and at their original 
inflated price. For the government to fail to do so would 
result in a government insured fractional reserve 
institution defaulting.
What has basically been described is the business cycle. If 
the Angel Gabriel expanded credit only once, this process 
would occur and the economy would eventually move closer and 
closer to equilibrium, providing there was nothing else to 
disturb it. But the Angel Gabriel committed to continuous 
credit expansion contracting credit only when he felt that 
inflation was rising too rapidly. He will not allow credit 
to contract for any significant period of time. The 
adjustment process just described will occur for every 
credit expansion. Since there is a continuous expansion, 
there will be a continuous adjustment reacting to an almost 
infinite number of events that will affect the rate at which 
the economy adjusts. It is impossible to predict the exact 
moment when the market will adjust and it will not adjust at 
a constant rate. It is safe to say, however, that 
eventually it will be impossible for the Angel to deceive
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the market. It is only in the early stages of a credit
expansion that the interest rate can be held below the
market rate of interest. The long term interest rate cannot
be affected. As Rothbard writes,
The answer is that an increase in the supply 
of money does lower the rate of interest when 
it enters the market as credit expansion, but 
only temporarily. In the long run, (and this 
long run is not very "long"), the market re­
establishes the free-market time-preference 
interest rate and eliminates the change. In the 
long run a change in the money stock affects 
only the value of the monetary unit.[15]
There are several degenerating forces operating here that 
will eventually force the collapse of the Angel's systems. 
First of all, the expansion of investment by fractional 
reserve institutions will force the contraction of 
investment by non-fractional reserve lenders. These are 
non-banking institutions or individuals that do not require 
reserves. This might be considered a variation of Gresham's 
Law where "bad debt" drives out "good debt". Or perhaps 
more precisely, "Continuous expansion of investment extended 
by governmentally insured institutions will eventually force 
investment extended by non-fractional reserve lenders off 
the market." (Unless another has come up with this idea, 
maybe this can be "Koch's Law".) Ultimately this system has 
the potential to drive out all non-fractional reserve 
lending, where fractional reserve institutions extend all 
investment, and non-fractional reserve lenders have left the
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market and their investors have switched all their funds 
into consumption.
Secondly, in the early stages of credit expansion, the ratio 
of investment extended by fractional reserve institutions to 
non-fractional reserve lenders is small, but as time passes 
the ratio must rise. A recession in the early stages is not 
serious because the fall in capital values will primarily be 
written off by non-fractional reserve lenders. A recession 
in the latter stages of a continuous credit expansion is 
very serious, for most of the debt in the economy is 
extended by fractional reserve institutions. A sharp drop 
in capital values against which this debt is secure will 
force the fractional reserve institutions to default. It 
would not take very many defaults by institutions guaranteed 
by the government to destroy confidence in the entire 
system. A massive bank run of the entire system would 
result.
But the Angel Gabriel has promised to guarantee the 
liabilities of these institutions, in effect guaranteeing 
their assets at inflated capital values! When the 
fractional reserve institutions extend the lion's share of 
investment in the economy, capital values cannot fall very 
far, for the government has guaranteed their value. Under 
this system, the government must, in effect, "sell debt low
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and later buy debt high." Exactly the opposite of any 
rational, profitable, enterprise.
Even continuing the previous rate of credit expansion will 
not be enough at this point. Individuals have begun to 
anticipate the credit expansion, and the market, which 
reacted slowly at first, is now reacting more quickly than 
the Angel can expand credit. It is at this point that the 
Angel Gabriel is faced with two equally unappealing choices: 
continue the credit generation at ever higher rates until 
the currency and the entire fractional reserve system 
collapses, or slow the rate of credit expansion, allow 
capital values to fall and consequently allow the collapse 
of the fractional reserve banking system. The Angel no 
longer has any "brakes" and can only use the "accelerator" 
if he wishes to delay the crisis. Either path leads to the 
same outcome: collapse the system.
This is an example of the "runaway boom" described by 
Rothbard but it is an inevitable consequence of the logical 
contradictions upon which any fractional reserve system is 
based and not necessarily malicious or inept behavior on the 
part of government. Fractional reserve institutions by 
their very nature always extend loans at below the market 
rate of interest. It must be stressed, however, that the 
"nominal" rate of interest may not fall at all during a
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credit expansion. In fact, it often rises. As Rothbard 
writes,
Credit expansion does not necessarily lower 
the interest rate below the rate previously 
recorded; it lowers the rate below what it 
would have been in the free market and thus 
creates distortions and malinvestments.[16]
This disheartens the Angel Gabriel for once again his 
attempt to "produce bread from stones" has failed and he has 
wrecked the Ruritanian economy. But there is still hope for 
he has just begun to read Human Action by Ludwig van Mises.
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PART THREE
FRACTIONAL RESERVE FREE BANKING
7. Introduction
The central assertion of this thesis is that a fractional 
reserve system is not viable in the long run due to the 
logical contradictions upon which it is based. In recent 
years, however, there has been much interest in what is 
called "free banking". This point of view correctly 
identifies the need to remove government intervention in the 
banking industry but stops short of prohibiting fractional 
reserve. Free banking theorists show the superiority of 
unregulated fractional reserve over central banking, but 
fail to show that a 100 percent free banking system would 
function even better. Fractional reserve free banking is 
superior because competition among banks places greater 
limits on credit expansion than central banking. Mises 
writes,
If the governments had never interfered, 
the use of banknotes and deposit currency 
would be limited to those strata of the 
population who know very well how to dis­
tinguish between solvent and insolvent 
banks. No large-scale credit expansion 
would have been possible.[17]
Rothbard has clearly outlined the moral problems involved 
with fractional reserve banking, and this section will 
emphasize the basic practical problem of fractional reserve:
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the ultimate collapse of the credit expansion. This is an
important question for if a fractional reserve free banking
system were to be implemented, its destabilizing effects
would be generally seen as an indictment of the free market
and not as an attempt to operate a fundamentally flawed
system. It is unfortunate that several authors who are
otherwise sympathetic to free market principles do not
realize that a fractional reserve system should be codified
into law as a fraudulent practice. As Rothbard writes,
Banking theory, however, has taken a very 
bad turn with free banking. We have to show 
that this is the old currency school argument 
rehashed...moreover the free banking people 
violate the basic Ricardian doctrine that 
every supply of money is optimal. Once a 
market in a money is established, there is no 
longer a need for more money. That is really 
the key point.[18]
A recent book on this subject is George Selgin’s,
The Theory of Free Banking. In this section, I will briefly 
review Selgin's main points and then, applying the Angel 
Gabriel model developed earlier, show that 100 percent free 
banking is far superior to fractional reserve free banking 
not only for macro-stability but also for depositors and the 
banking system itself. I will review the historical record 
and show that fractional reserve free banking has never 
operated without chronic, periodic, financial crises, which 
would be absent under 100 percent free banking. Fractional 
reserve banking interferes with the economy's attempts to
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move toward equilibrium. Contrary to the free banking 
theorists, fractional reserve banking can only disrupt 
equilibrium, not facilitate movement towards it.
8. George Selgin: The Theory of Free Banking
One of the most important recent works on fractional reserve 
free banking is George Selgin's The Theory of Free Banking. 
This section will briefly highlight some of the main ideas 
Selgin has illustrated in this book. As Lawrence White 
writes,
The central results show that the standard 
'rule of excess reserves1— that a competi­
tive bank cannot safely expand its liabilities 
by more than the size of its excess reserves—  
applies to note-issuing as well as to the more 
familiar deposit-creating banks, provided 
that money-holders do not accept various 
brands of notes indiscriminately. The rule 
does not, however, apply to a monopoly issuer.
What is more provocative, we learn that the 
limits to note issue expand when the demand 
to hold inside money increases, and that the 
consequent expansion of bank liabilities and 
assets is warranted by considerations of 
credit-market equilibrium. A bank is able to 
vary its liabilities in response to demand 
shifts even if its reserves are unchanging, 
because an increase in holding demand implies a 
fall in the rate of turnover, hence in the 
optimal reserve ratio. The theory of optimal 
reserves elaborated by Selgin undermines the 
mechanistic textbook view of the reserve ratio 
as constant, and links changes in desired bank 
reserve ratios to changes in the money multi­
plier. A further surprising and novel exten­
sion is the refutation of the standard view
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that no economic forces check a concerted 
expansion by banks.[19]
Selgin begins with a brief historical review that only 
serves to cloud the debate as to the success or failure of 
fractional reserve free banking in actual practice.
9. The Historical Record
Both George Selgin and Larry White have identified many 
examples of supposedly successful fractional reserve free 
banking systems. If it is really true that a fractional 
reserve system is destabilizing, how is it that these 
systems appeared to operate for significant periods of time?
There is much debate on this point and it may be that these
systems only appeared to work or were not allowed to operate
long enough or freely enough for them to collapse on their
own. As Rothbard writes,
In recent years, disillusionment in central 
banking has understandably set in among many 
economists. As a result, some writers have 
turned to the alternative of free banking, 
praising both the theoretical model and his­
torical cases in which free banking has
allegedly worked effectively. But there may 
have been an unwise rush to judgement. [20]
This section will discuss this debate.
CHILE
In the case of Chile, where free banking supposedly
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operated, Rothbard points out that for the first half of the 
nineteenth century Chile "was devoted to the idea of a pure, 
100 percent commodity money."[21] After the establishment 
of a fractional reserve free banking system in 1860, Chile 
embarked upon a "long-run generally accelerating course of 
inflation,"[22] that was to last for nearly fifty years. 
Instead of leading to prosperity and stability, the 
establishment of fractional reserve banking led only to 
inflation and monetary crisis.
Selgin countered Rothbard with an article in Austrian 
Economics Newsletter entitled, "Short Changed in Chile: The 
Truth about the Free-Banking Episode." [23] In this article 
Selgin claims that the problems with Chile's fractional 
reserve free banking system were a result of the Chilean's 
government intervention and not any fundamental flaw in 
fractional reserve. "Chile's free banking system was 
undermined by, (1) its bimetallic legislation of 1851 and 
(2) its sanctioning of inconvertible currency to ease the 
government's fiscal burdens in connection with its war 
with Spain and again in 1878." [24]
Selgin does not feel that fractional reserve free banking 
failed in Chile, yet he underscores a problem that free 
banking theorists have in making their case. It is very 
difficult to find in the historical record an example of a
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pure fractional reserve free banking system that actually 
operated during a period of macro-stability for a 
significant length of time.
SCOTLAND
Initially, Selgin and White pointed to the Scottish free
banking system of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries as something of an ideal model for a fractional
reserve free banking system. Selgin writes,
From 1792 to 1845, Scotland had no central 
bank, allowed unrestricted competition in 
the business of note issue, and imposed almost 
no regulations on its banking firms. Yet 
the Scottish system was thought to be superior 
by nearly everyone who was aware of it. Its
decline after 1845 was caused, not by any
shortcoming, but in consequence of the unpro­
voked extension of Peel's Act, which ended 
new entry into the note issue business in 
Scotland as well as England."[25]
In the note which followed this passage Selgin wrote, 
"Lawrence White’s excellent and comprehensive study of the 
Scottish system, Free Banking in Britain, makes it 
unnecessary for us to delve into the details of that episode 
here."[26]
Rothbard later countered the claims that the Scottish system 
was free and stable in, "The Myth of Free Banking in 
Scotland." [27] Contrary to being an excellent and 
comprehensive study of the Scottish system, Rothbard points
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out that Free Banking in Britain is, "a brief book of less 
than two hundred pages, only 26 are devoted to the Scottish 
question and White admits that he relies for facts of 
Scottish banking almost solely on a few secondary 
sources."[28]
Free banking theorists claim that fractional reserve free 
banking is stable and has a stabilizing effect on the entire 
economy by efficiently responding to changes in the demand 
for currency and bank deposits (inside money). The Scottish 
system clearly did not provide stability. Rothbard writes,
But why should lack of bank failure be a 
sign of superiority? On the contrary, a 
dearth of bank failures should rather be 
treated with suspicion, as witness the drop 
of bank failures in the United States since 
the advent of the FDIC. It might indeed mean 
that the banks are doing better, but at 
expense of society and the economy faring 
worse. Bank failures are a healthy weapon 
by which the market keeps bank credit in­
flation in check; an absence of failure might 
well mean that that check is doing poorly and 
that inflation of money and credit is all the 
more rampant. In any case, a lower rate of 
bank failure can scarcely be accepted as any 
sort of evidence for the superiority of a 
banking system.
In fact, in a book that Professor White 
acknowledges to be the definitive history of 
Scottish banking, Professor Sydney Checkland 
points out that Scottish banks expanded and 
contracted credit in a lengthy series of boom- 
bust cycles, in particular in the years 
surrounding the crises of the 1760s, 1772, 
1778, 1793, 1797, 1802-03, 1809-10, 1810-11,
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1818-19, 1825-26, 1836-37, 1839 and 
1845-47. Apparently, the Scottish banks escaped 
none of the destabilizing, cycle-generating 
behavior of their English cousins.[29]
Larry J. Sechrest also challenged White in his article,
"White's Free-Banking Thesis: A Case of Mistaken
Identity."[30] Referring to S. G. Checkland's,
Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973, he writes,
Further, Checkland's description of the expan­
sionary phases that preceded each "crisis" 
sounds much like the scenario of credit- 
induced malinvestment that lies at the heart 
of the classic Misesian business cycle. 
Checkland sums it up well when he states:
'In principle, it [the Scottish system] 
should have been capable of stability, or 
at least, of fairly easy contraction. In 
reality, it was not.’ Due, perhaps, to its 
being established upon the wrong principle?[31]
Clearly the Scottish system was neither stable nor free.
Financial crises are very disruptive to the economy and one
wonders why one would choose a banking system that makes
them inevitable (fractional reserve free banking) over one
that precludes their possibility (100 percent reserve). The
Scottish system is certainly not a model for reform.
Sechrest concludes,
--the Scottish system was de facto a central 
bank system in which individual private banks 
pyramided their note issues upon the reserves 
of the three chartered banks, which, in turn, 
pyramided their issues upon the reserves of 
the ultimate source of liquidity for the 
entire British Isles: the Bank of England.[32]
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After this example, claims of fractional reserve free 
banking theorists of stability and freedom must be carefully 
questioned and researched.
CHINA
In yet another example of allegedly successful fractional
reserve free banking, Selgin refers to China. He writes,
Although banking under the Manchus was 
subject in many places to local and pro­
vincial regulations, in others it was 
entirely free. One such case was the 
banking system of Foochow, the capital of 
Fukien province. From the beginning of the 
19th century until the second quarter of the 
twentieth Foochow's banking and currency 
system was entirely private and free from 
any regulatory restrictions.[33]
Loans by Foochow banks were not secured by specific capital
assets as are most loans extended by western banks. "The
security here was the borrower's general property rather
than specific collateral."[34] Consequently, the effects of
the business cycle would not erode the bank's asset
portfolio to the same extent as western banks. The Foochow
banks could seize the borrower's general property for the
full value of the outstanding loan and they would not lose
any assets. By contrast, when western banks seize a
defaulter's property, it usually consists of the capital
asset against which the loan was secured. If the market
value of the capital asset has fallen (which is a
characteristic of the end of a credit expansion, or bust)
the bank suffers.
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Following White's example, Selgin uses as his indicator of
stability, the number of bank failures.
Prior to 1922 local bank failures were 
confined to small banks or cash shops. A 
mid-19th century observer reported that only 
four small banks had failed from 1844 to 1848, 
and that a general crush, seriously affecting 
the public interest, is a thing unheard 
of.[35]
Nothing is said, however, of the overall stability of the 
economy. The Foochow system of securing debt against a 
debtor's general property would limit the losses of the 
lending bank, but would not save the economy from the 
effects of the business cycle. In addition, if the market 
value of the borrower's general property fell below the 
value of the loan (due to the fall in capital values), the 
bank would suffer a loss. If this loss could somehow be 
anticipated, it would be reflected in the terms of the loan. 
If not, either the debtor or creditor would suffer and, most 
certainly, the economy at large.
In addition, the capital structure of China in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was very primitive 
with most capital being very close to consumption. Because 
the business cycle has greater impact on more advanced 
stages of capital, it would have had little effect on China 
at that time. Little can be learned as to how a fractional 
reserve free banking system might operate in an advanced
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capitalistic economy, from the historical example of free 
banking in China.
Other Historical Examples
According to the Austrian theory of the business cycle, 
credit expansion generates the business cycle, yet most 
fractional reserve free banking theorists claim that it is 
stable. The instability of the Scottish system is obviously 
in dispute, but what about the stability of other fractional 
reserve free banking systems?
Selgin contends that most fractional reserve free banking
systems operated throughout most of their history with few
crises. With regard to the Canadian system, he writes, "The
Canadian system was an example of a well working free
banking system which suffered few crises and included some
of the world's most prestigious banking firms."[36] The
Canadian banking system suffered no bank failures during
1930-33 in stark contrast to the U.S. during the same
period. Of the Swedish system that existed between 1831-
1902, he writes,
One measure of the success of the Swedish pri­
vate note-issuing banks is that, throughout 
their existence, none failed even though the 
government had an explicit policy of not assisting 
private banks in financial trouble. ...Finally, 
the absence of banking regulations in Sweden was 
crucial to its exceptionally rapid economic growth 
during the second half of the 19th century.[37]
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Unfortunately, the number of bank failures in a certain 
period is not a good indicator of the stability of 
fractional reserve free banking systems. There were no bank 
failures in the U.S. system until the 1980s because of 
Federal Deposit insurance, yet the entire system of 
government insurance has been strained to the breaking point 
and appears to be getting worse. Also, neither of the 
systems was really free in a pure sense. If they had been 
completely free, there may have been failures. Also, the 
fact that Sweden enjoyed high rates of growth during 
its relatively free banking episode is meaningless when one 
considers the high growth rates enjoyed by other nations 
(such as the U.S.) whose banking systems were less free 
during the same period. Growth rates may have been even 
higher under 100 percent reserve banking.
Conclusion
Selgin admits that the historical argument in his book is
inconclusive. He concludes with,
Unfortunately, there have been few free 
banking episodes in the past, none of which 
realized it in pure form. Thus history fur­
nishes an inadequate basis for drawing theore­
tical conclusions about free banking. To rely 
exclusively on it would invite generalizing 
from features unique to a single episode or 
from features attributable to regulation.[38]
Selgin claims that "the historical record does not provide
any clear evidence of the failure except politically  of
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free banking." [39] The historical record does not provide 
any clear record of its success, either. Cases such as 
Scotland that were initially held as examples of the success 
of fractional reserve free banking have failed upon closer 
study to support Selgin's thesis. Where fractional reserve 
free banking has failed, Selgin claims it is a result of 
government intervention. The Theory of Free Banking clearly 
shows the superiority of fractional reserve free banking 
over centralized banking, but Selgin has not shown that it 
is superior to 100 percent banking or even viable in the 
long run.
Several Theoretical Scenarios of Free Banking Failure
In "Implications of Free Banking and Note Issue: Answers to 
some questions",[40] Selgin considers several scenarios in 
which a banking system might fail. He begins by questioning 
why most individuals would wish to withdraw all their funds 
from a fractional reserve banking system at the same time, 
"If the public were truly indifferent concerning these 
advantages of bank money, fractional reserve banking would 
have never arisen in the first place; like the sizes of 
bridges and tunnels, the size of bank's holdings of reserves 
relative to liabilities reflects observed patterns of public 
behavior over long stretches of time." [41]
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Selgin has, like many others, inappropriately identified 
bridges as a form of fractional reserve. The fallacy of 
this argument has been discussed earlier. Beyond this 
inappropriate comparison, Selgin has assumed that a 
fractional reserve free banking system could operate in 
something close to equilibrium and that it is not disruptive 
to equilibrium in and of itself. As he states, "A run on 
the banks, leading to unexpected withdrawals of the ultimate 
money of redemption must therefore be something exceptional, 
due to extraordinary circumstances."[42] He gives several 
examples of these "extraordinary circumstances".
In the first example, he assumes a bank failure due to poor 
management. If the bank has truly been mismanaged, then it 
should be allowed to fail. If its asset portfolio is sound, 
then it will be purchased by another institution as a quick 
method to increase market share and its clients will not 
lose. In the second example he deals with bank run 
"contagion effects". These could be dealt with in our 
present system by creation of a secondary market for bank 
liabilities and would not be a problem at all under free 
banking. He concludes this example by stating, "under free 
banking, no information externality problem would exist to 
give rise to a bank-run contagion."[43] The third example 
is a natural or national disaster. In this case he asks,
"How then, would banks in a free banking system respond?
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They would probably respond the way insurance companies 
presently respond to great national as well as natural 
disasters: by having a special clause in their agreements 
with its customers, allowing them to refrain from meeting 
their obligations in the usual manner whenever a great 
emergency occurs."[44]
Although some insurance companies operate as fractional 
reserve institutions, they need not necessarily so do.
Selgin has once again inappropriately compared fractional 
reserve banking to other enterprises such as insurance 
companies. Selgin feels that as long as depositors are 
aware that certain banks maintain an option clause where 
they may suspend specie payment under special circumstances 
there is no problem. To him, this is just an extension of 
the principle of "freedom of choice". Individuals would be 
free to trade with banks that promise to redeem in specie at 
all times and under any circumstances or with banks that 
suspend payment.
Selgin clearly believes that there is nothing inherently 
unstable about fractional reserve banking, only in systems 
that are not "free banking". When referring to the dramatic 
rise in the demand for money that often occurs at the end of 
an expansion of credit he writes,
Such disturbances caused by changes in currency
demand are what monetarists like Henry Simons,
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Lloyd Mints, and Milton Friedman have in 
mind when they refer to the "inherent insta­
bility" of fractional reserve banking. Yet 
this instability is really not inherent in 
fractional reserve banking at all. It is 
only inherent in fractional reserve banking 
systems that lack freedom of note issue, 
including, in particular, all central 
banking systems.[45]
He does not consider the problems discussed above a serious 
impediment to the operation of a fractional reserve banking 
system. Even granting an ideal banking world to Selgin, 
however, where there are no natural or national disasters 
and no loss of confidence in the system, he still fails to 
address one critical point: that which follows from the 
central idea of this thesis. Over time, all enterprises and 
all stages of production will return something close to the 
market rate of interest.[46] The profits generated by an 
enterprise will eventually just cover the costs of that 
enterprise plus the market rate of return on the capital 
invested in that enterprise. When a certain enterprise 
returns profits above the market rate of interest, 
entrepreneurs from less profitable enterprises invest 
capital until competition brings the rate of return down to 
the market rate of interest.
The opposite occurs when an enterprise operates below the 
market rate of interest. Entrepreneurs will leave an 
industry that is returning something less than the market
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rate of return and enter an industry that is returning the 
market rate. Any enterprise cannot consistently operate 
above or below the market rate of interest forever. When a 
fractional reserve institution extends credit it must do so 
at a rate of interest below the market rate. Fractional 
reserve free banking, by its very nature, must operate below 
rates of return that it would receive if it were not 
fractional reserve. Consequently, fractional reserve free 
banking must fail not because of any exogenous event but 
because of the endogenous contradictions upon which it is 
based. Loss of confidence in the system or a national or 
natural disaster would exacerbate already existing problems 
and the credit expansion would eventually collapse 
regardless of these events.
The Impossibility of Achieving Equilibrium Under Fractional 
Reserve Free Banking
Because historical examples do little to support his 
argument, Selgin embarks upon a theoretical model. He also 
employs the fictional nation of Ruritania as has Mises and 
Rothbard before him. He continues with a solid discussion 
on the development of money, money warehouses, and then 
banks in fictional Ruritania. He then treats the 
development of fractional reserve banking as an important 
and logical next step. "The lending of depositor's balances 
is a significant innovation: it taps a vast new source of
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loanable funds and fundamentally alters the relationship 
between Ruritanian bankers and their d e p o s i t o r s [47]
After this brief introduction, Selgin then makes a startling 
assumption. He contends that it is possible for an 
equilibrium condition to be achieved between the supply and 
demand of loanable funds under fractional reserve free 
banking. It is here that he makes his fatal error. The 
analysis that follows and comprises the bulk of his book 
rests upon this fallacious assumption.
He states two conditions that must be met in order to
achieve equilibrium and, as usual, assumes the public will
hold only inside money. He writes,
As the public holds only inside money, 
with commodity money used only in bank 
reserves to settle clearing balances these 
conditions are as follows: First, the demand 
for reserves and the available stock of com­
modity money must be equal. Second, the 
real supply of inside money must be equal 
to the real demand for it. Once the first 
(reserve equilibrium) condition is met, the 
tendency is for any disequilibxium in the 
money supply to be corrected by adjustments 
in the nominal supply of inside money. An 
excess supply increases, and an excess demand 
reduces, the liquidity requirements (reserve 
demand) of the system. This is shown in 
chapters 5 and 6 below.
On the other hand, if the reserve-equilibrium 
condition is not satisfied, the system is 
still immature. An excess supply of reserves 
then causes an expansion of the supply of in­
side money. If this leads to an excess supply 
of inside money, it will promote an increase
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in both reserve demand and prices causing both 
the nominal demand for money and the demand 
for reserves to rise.
There must be one price level at which both 
equilibrium conditions are met. When this 
price level is achieved, the system is in a 
long-run equilibrium. For the sake of simpli­
city, the analysis that follows starts with a 
free banking system (similar to Ruritania's) in 
long-run equilibrium and assumes an unchanging 
supply of bank reserves.[48]
This equilibrium condition, however, cannot be met under 
fractional reserve banking for the nature of such a system 
constantly moves the economy away from equilibrium, not 
towards it. The analysis that follows this fallacious 
assumption is basically sound but meaningless if this 
equilibrium condition cannot be achieved. It is only under 
100 percent free banking that equilibrium between the supply 
and demand for credit can be achieved, and in fact much of 
Selgin's equilibrium analysis applies to a 100 percent 
system rather than a fractional reserve system. Fractional 
reserve credit expansion affects the market rate of interest 
and consequently the value of all capital and not just 
capital which may be purchased by these new loans or against 
which they are secured. This was Hayek's point when he 
wrote in the introduction of Prices and Production, "What 
was, however, of prime importance for my purpose was to 
emphasize that any change in the monetary demand for capital 
goods could not be treated as something which made itself
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felt only on some isolated market for new capital goods, 
but that it could be only understood as a change affecting 
the general demand for capital goods which is an essential 
aspect of the process of maintaining a given structure of 
p r o d u c t i o n [49] This is one of the main ideas of Hayek's 
book and he shows that monetary expansion affects the prices 
of all capital, not just specific markets or more advanced 
stages of capital (although these do tend to be stimulated 
to a greater degree than lower stages of capital). The 
following analysis will prove why this equilibrium 
(necessary for a fractional reserve free banking system to 
function smoothly), cannot be achieved.
10. Fractional Reserve Free Banking in Ruritania
At the heart of fractional reserve free banking theory is 
the assumption that equilibrium can be achieved between the 
supply and demand for credit under fractional reserve. Many 
economists (especially of the Austrian school) have shown 
the importance of building theories that rest firmly upon a 
realistic set of assumptions.[50] Selgin himself recognizes 
this fact when he writes, "To be really useful in 
interpreting the effects of regulation in the past, or in 
predicting the consequences of deregulation in the future, a 
theory of unregulated banking should be based on realistic 
assumptions drawn, if possible, from actual experience."[51] 
Unfortunately it is impossible to achieve equilibrium
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between the supply and demand for credit under any 
fractional reserve system.
I would like to introduce the Angel Gabriel again, to prove 
that fractional reserve banking frustrates even the best of 
intentions. After his disastrous experience earlier as 
Chairman of the Fed, he is eager to redeem himself. The 
Ruritanians have not lost faith in him. He is still in 
charge of the economy but with the collapse of the system 
there is little to manage. Centralized government 
controlled fractional reserve banking has collapsed and the 
banking system is now a 100 percent system in long run 
equilibrium. Time has passed and the economy has fully 
adjusted to the previous crisis. The system is very similar 
to the theoretical system that Selgin employs to illustrate 
his ideas except that it is not yet fractional reserve.
There is free entry into the banking system and no banking 
regulations. There is no credit extended by fractional 
reserve institutions at this point since to properly analyze 
fractional reserve banking one must start at the beginning 
and all fractional reserve institutions begin as 100 percent 
reserve.
Even institutions that plan to immediately become fractional 
reserve institutions the moment their doors open must begin 
as 100 percent institutions. At inception, fractional
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reserve institutions have no deposits; hence they are 100 
percent reserve institutions. The axis in Fig. 4 represents 
the interest rate and the x axis represents the total amount 
of credit extended in the economy. Over time, the Angel 
Gabriel has noted that never more than 20 percent of total 
deposits (after clearings) are ever withdrawn from the 100 
percent reserve banking system. Thinking that his previous 
mistakes were a result of centralization and government 
control, the Angel feels that it might be a good time to 
introduce fractional reserve free banking and allow market 
forces to keep the extension of credit and the issuance of 
banknotes within "reasonable limits". He has read George 
Selgin's book, The Theory of Free Banking, and is eager to 
put these ideas into practice. The Angel feels that the 
economy will be better able to respond to changes in the 
demand for money and credit and that this will result in a 
rise in the standard of living due to increased investment.
When the Angel is questioned by one of the local Ruritanians
(who is also an avid student of Mises and Rothbard), about
the effects of credit expansion as illustrated by the
Austrian theory of the business cycle, the Angel feels these
effects would be negligible under fractional reserve free
banking. He says,
The problem with the Austrians, is that 
they completely ignore the demand side of 
the money market. Monetary disequilibrium
only occurs when money is issued in excess 
of demand for money balances at given prices. 
Harking back to the equation of exchange,
(MV=PQ) [52], the optimal reserve ratio is 
a function of MV, money times velocity.
One needs to distinguish between changes in 
the stock of bank money that accomodate changes 
in the public's willingness to hold bank money 
(so that the increased stock of bank money 
doesn’t add to total spending) and changes 
that do add to total spending and hence tend 
to raise prices and the prices of factors of 
production. One must look at the "stream of 
spending" M times V) and stabilize that, not 
the price level. If the banks are behaving in 
such a way that M increases only when V falls, 
and vice versa, there is no problem. Starting 
from this framework, excessive bank expansion i 
defined in a different way and one must ask if 
free banks engage in that kind excessive 
expansion, which they don't tend to do. They 
tend, in fact to stabilize MV since the optimum 
reserve ratio is a function of MV. If MV rises 
the banks will need more reserves. If the 
quantity of reserves is fixed, the banks will 
not be able to expand credit beyond this point. 
The quantity of MV is stabilized automatically. 
There is no link between fractional reserve 
banking and monetary trade cycles, although 
trade cycles can be very severe with fractional 
reserve banking, (which I found out early in my 
career), but only with a banking system that 
allows MV to fluctuate, which central banking 
systems do.
With this explanation the Angel dismisses the Ruritanian 
begins his planned credit expansion.
Because only 20 percent of the deposits in the Ruritanian 
banking system are ever withdrawn, the Angel encourages a 
gradual expansion of credit that will eventually equal 80 
percent of total deposits. The Ruritanians follow his 
advice and credit expands from Cl to C2 in Fig. 5. This
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also results in a five fold increase in the Ruritanian money 
supply due to the money multiplier. The amount of credit 
extended by non-bank sources is indicated by 0C1, and the 
amount of credit extended by fractional reserve is indicated 
by C1C2. The interest rate falls from il to i2.
At the interest rate of i2, however, there are fewer 
individuals who wish to save and invest their funds. At 
this interest rate they would prefer to consume rather than 
to invest, so their funds are withdrawn from the credit 
market as these loans mature or are sold at a discount on a 
secondary credit market. In Fig. 5, C1C3 amount of credit 
begins to be withdrawn from the market and, as the interest 
rate rises, the withdrawal slows until, in Fig. 6, it stops 
at C4 and the interest rate settles at i3.
This is not an equilibrium position, however, for the value 
of the capital against which these loans were secured has 
fallen and the creditors who extended these loans must now 
suffer losses. Ceteris paribus, the interest rate varies 
inversely with the value of capital. During the credit 
expansion, the value of capital (against which both non-bank 
credit and fractional reserve credit was secured) increased 
as the interest rate fell. Loans extended after the onset 
of the credit expansion were secured against inflated 
capital. When creditors began to leave the market, the
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interest rate began to rise and the value of capital began
to fall. This will hurt all creditors, but especially
creditors who extended loans during, or at the end of the
credit expansion. For the most part, these will be
fractional reserve institutions since they were extending
credit while non-bank investors were withdrawing credit. As
Frank Fetter wrote,
Contract [interest] is based on and tends to
conform to economic interest [i.e., the 'natural
interest' price differential between stages]...
It is economic interest that we seek to explain 
logically through the economic nature of the 
goods. Contract interest is a secondary problem-a 
business and legal problem-as to who shall have
the benefit of the income arising with the
possession of the goods. It is closely connected 
with the question of ownership.[53]
Loans are extended against the current market value of a
capital asset. If the value of that capital asset falls in
the future, the creditor suffers losses, for in essence, the
creditor is the true owner of the capital. As Mises writes,
"The creditor is always a virtual partner of the debtor or a
virtual owner of the pledged and mortgaged property. He can
be affected by changes in the market data concerning them.
He has linked his fate with that of the debtor or with the
changes occurring in the price of the collateral. Capital,
as such, does not bear interest; it must be well employed
and invested not only in order to yield interest, but also
lest it disappear entirely."[54]
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As the economy attempts to move back to its equilibrium 
position, the interest rate rises and the value of capital 
falls. Because by the very nature of fractional reserve, 
the majority of the loans extended during the credit 
expansion were extended by fractional reserve institutions, 
they will find themselves in a very embarrassing position. 
Now that the economy has begun to adjust, inflation has set 
in as a result of the five-fold increase in the money supply 
during the credit expansion.
Fractional reserve institutions will find that although 
never more than 20 percent of deposits were ever withdrawn 
(after clearing) under 100 percent banking, more than 20 
percent will be withdrawn under fractional reserve. This 
will occur whether or not there is a loss of confidence in 
the system. The dramatic rise in prices will necessitate a 
much greater amount of money in circulation to sustain the 
same number of purchases. Small purchases for which the 
writing of checks is impractical, will require more specie 
which much be withdrawn from the banks.
This will occur at the worst possible time for the banks, 
for their asset portfolio has fallen and they must begin 
contracting credit and increasing reserves. Their debtors 
(those who borrowed from fractional reserve institutions) 
will find that the enterprises they have embarked upon have
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proved to be not nearly as profitable as they had thought 
and will wish to borrow even more in order to keep their 
malinvested enterprises afloat. They will also wish to 
borrow at the old, low interest rates that they originally 
received. But fractional reserve institutions are 
contracting credit at this point, not extending credit.
What appears to be an increase in the demand for credit is 
really just an attempt to postpone the demise of 
malinvestments undertaken during the credit expansion.
Contrary to fractional reserve free banking theorists, 
fractional reserve institutions will not be able to respond 
to this illusory increase in credit demand because it occurs 
simultaneously with the strong forces that are forcing these 
institutions to contract credit.
Fractional reserve institutions begin to fail, not because 
of government interference, but because of the inherent 
logical contradictions of this system itself. The 
inevitable loss of reserves, devaluation of its asset 
portfolio and inability to extend credit will force the 
fractional reserve banking system to contract credit and 
cause depositors to fear for the safety of their deposits. 
This may lead to a run on the banks which will cause an 
immediate and possibly fatal crisis. Bank runs have in the 
past been the most evident and sensational phenomenon of
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fractional reserve banking. But the system would still be 
forced to contract credit and lose profits even if a bank 
run did not occur. Far from increasing investment and adding 
to the stock of capital, fractional reserve banking (even if 
it is completely free) wastes investment and ultimately 
leads to a lower stock of capital than there would have been 
under 100 percent reserve.
Although it may initially appear as a great boon to the 
banking industry, fractional reserve ultimately results in 
great losses to the banking industry and a lower return on 
their investment than under 100 percent reserve. Fractional 
reserve banks, by their very nature, must extend credit at 
below the market rate of interest whereas under 100 percent 
reserve, both deposit banks and investment banks should 
expect to receive the market rate of interest over time. 
Again, the fractional reserve free banking theorists are 
wrong, for fractional reserve wastes investment, not 
increases it, lowers banking profits, not raises them and is 
unable to efficiently respond to changes in the demand for 
credit.
During the bust, non-bank credit should increase as the 
interest rate rises but the total amount of credit extended 
will contract as the decrease in fractional reserve credit 
will more than offset any increase in non-bank credit. At
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this point, when the fractional reserve institutions have 
fully absorbed their losses, they may be tempted to expand 
credit once again and the same sad story will repeat itself. 
It is not even possible to imagine a situation where the 
economy could be in equilibrium under fractional reserve.
Let us consider Fig. 7 where the interest rate and the 
amount of credit extended in the economy appear to be in 
equilibrium at the intersection of the supply and demand 
curves of credit. This appearance is deceptive, however, 
for when considering the total amount of credit extended in 
the economy one must consider both credit extended by 
fractional reserve institutions and that extended by non­
bank sources.
An entrepreneur who invests his time and money in a project 
of his own can be considered to be "investing in himself", 
for he could invest his money and labor elsewhere. He is a 
100 percent reserve investor and "invests in himself" 
because he expects higher returns than investing elsewhere.
A loan extended by either a fractional reserve institution 
or an individual or investment firm must still be secured by 
some existing capital and at the current market value for 
that capital. The only difference, although a crucial one, 
is that fractional reserve extends its loans with funds that 
may be claimed on demand by another party (and are intended
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for consumption) while loans extended by an individual or a 
non-bank source (intended for investment) may not be claimed 
until the loan matures. The immediate effect on the credit 
market is the same, however. New credit has the same effect 
on the interest rate, the value of capital, and the supply 
of credit whether it originates from fractional reserve or 
non-bank sources.
The long term effect is quite different. Fractional reserve 
credit generates the business cycle, malinvestment, losses 
for creditors (especially fractional reserve institutions 
themselves) and ultimately a lower standard of living than 
what would have been. Non-bank credit generates solid 
steady growth, higher returns for creditors (especially 
banks), and ultimately a higher standard of living.
Returning to Fig. 7, Ruritania is not in equilibrium since 
at interest rate i, more non-bank investors wish to extend 
credit than are presently on the market. There will be a 
net increase of non-bank credit. Assuming the amount of 
fractional reserve credit stays the same, non-bank credit 
will increase until interest rate i2, in Fig. 8, is reached. 
The interest rate of i2, however, is lower than il where 
most of the fractional reserve credit was extended.
Due to inflation, their return on investment will not be as 
high as the fractional reserve institutions had anticipated
and they will suffer losses. There will be a drain of 
reserves and once again the fractional reserve free banking 
system must suffer losses. Equilibrium cannot possibly be 
achieved until all fractional reserve credit is removed from 
the market. Fractional reserve free banking may be superior 
to centralized banking because of the lack of government 
intervention and a fixed supply of gold reserves, but only 
to the extent that it limits credit expansion. Fractional 
reserve free banking is not stable and it is not even clear 
that it is viable in the long run. If it is viable, it does 
so at lower investment and lower standard of living than a 
100 percent reserve banking system.
One hundred percent reserve banking is superior to 
fractional reserve free banking because it eliminates credit 
expansion altogether. Instead of ignoring the demand side 
of the money market (as the Angel Gabriel once thought), he 
now realizes that the Austrians were correct in emphasizing 
the disruptive effects of fractional reserve banking, for 
all the Angel's carefully drawn analysis collapses under 
conditions of continuing disequilibrium. This truth finally 
dawns upon the Angel Gabriel and the Ruritanians.
Fractional reserve banking is codified into law as a 
fraudulent practice, all banks become 100 percent reserve 
deposit banks and Ruritania finally begins a period of 
stable growth with a profitable, crisis-free banking system.
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Fractional Reserve Free Banking Under Constant Money Demand
Although it is impossible to achieve equilibrium under any 
form of fractional reserve, George Selgin makes this 
assumption and uses it as the foundation of most of his 
book, The Theory of Free Banking. He begins chapter 3, 
"Credit Expansion with Constant Money Demand," by stating, 
"Throughout the chapter it is assumed that the public's 
total demand between the two forms of inside money (currency 
and demand deposits) are constant."[55] Unfortunately, the 
demand for inside money cannot possibly remain constant 
under credit expansion for the inevitable inflation 
generated by the credit expansion will later change the 
public's demand for inside money.
Using the "Rule of Excess Reserves," "The Principle of 
Adverse Clearings," and assuming "Note-Brand 
Discrimination," Selgin shows that there are limits to 
banknote creation as well as deposit creation. The analysis 
is clearly and logically written and follows correctly from 
the initial assumption upon which it is based. It is 
meaningless, however, for fractional reserve banking 
generates forces that will upset equilibrium between the 
supply and demand for money and will continually upset the 
economy's efforts to return to equilibrium.
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Fractional Reserve Free Banking Under Changing Money Demand
As Leland Yeager writes, "Probably Selgin's most 
'provocative' analytical point (to adopt White's word) is 
that the economic limits to note and deposit issue expand 
when the public's demand for bank money grows."[56]
In chapter 4, Selgin clarifies what is meant by the demand 
for money which is often confused with the demand for bank 
credit or loanable funds. He writes, "Thus to be useful the 
expression demand for money must refer to peoples' desire to 
hold money balances and not just to the fact that they agree 
to receive money in exchange for other goods and services, 
including later-dated claims to money."[57] This is 
consistent with Rothbard who writes, "The total demand for 
money on the market consists of two parts: the exchange 
demand for money (by sellers of all other goods that wish to 
purchase money) and the reservation demand for money (the 
demand for money to hold by those who already hold it)."[58]
It is Selgin's contention that fractional reserve free 
banking facilitates movement toward equilibrium by better 
responding to changes in the demand for money than either 
100 percent, or centralized banking. Concerning equilibrium 
he writes,
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As used here 'monetary equilibrium’ will 
mean the state of affairs that prevails 
when there is neither an excess demand for 
money nor an excess supply of it at the 
existing level of prices. When a change 
in the (nominal) supply of money is demand 
accommodating— that is, when it corrects 
what would otherwise be a short-run excess
demand or excess supply the change will be
called 'warranted' because it maintains mone­
tary equilibrium.[59]
He continues, "Whenever a bank expands its liabilities in
the process of making new loans and investments, it is the
holders of the liabilities who are the ultimate lenders of
credit, and what they lend are the real resources they could
acquire if instead of holding money, they spent it."[60]
Selgin is confusing two different markets here: the market
for money and the market for loanable funds. This was also
a problem with the banking school. The Austrian policy
prescription in this case would be to allow equilibration
through market processes such as changes in the purchasing
power of money and the interest rate. Selgin, in an effort
to avoid the temporary dislocations that may be involved in
this process, feels that equilibration can be achieved by
fractional reserve free banking without any dislocations.
His analysis is fundamentally flawed however.
One of the main criticisms of 100 percent banking by 
fractional reserve banking theorists is that it is slow to 
respond to changes in the demand for loanable funds because 
of the inelastic supply of gold. (Throughout this example I
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would like to assume as do most theorists that a 100 percent 
banking system would be based on gold.) They claim 
fractional reserve is necessary to respond to the "needs of 
trade". Let us consider a theoretical example to compare 
responses of fractional reserve banking to an increase in 
the demand for loanable funds with that of non-bank lenders.
Because the supply and demand of loanable funds is 
determined solely by time preferences, any change in the 
demand for credit implies a change in time preferences. 
Figures 9.1 and 10.1 consider two different banking systems; 
fractional reserve free banking and one hundred percent 
reserve. The total amount of loanable funds extended in 
both economies is represented on the x axis while the 
interest rate is represented on the y axis. Figure 9.1 is 
in long run equilibrium. In Fig. 10.1 the total amount of 
loanable funds is divided between that which is extended by 
fractional reserve free banking institutions and 100% 
reserve banks.
Although in this example, the amount of credit extended in 
Fig. 10.1, intersects the supply and demand curves for 
credit, this is not an equilibrium position. Since 
equilibrium is impossible under fractional reserve, this 
economy is in a state of flux, constantly responding to the 
disruptive effects of credit expansion. Attempts made by the
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economy to move towards equilibrium (the bust) will be 
offset by new injections of credit (the boom). Because 
equilibrium is impossible under fractional reserve, any 
analysis must either begin in disequilibrium or in 
equilibrium under 100 percent reserve and then move to 
fractional reserve and disequilibrium. In this example, in 
order to discuss the effects of a change in the demand for 
money in a fractional reserve free banking system we will 
begin in disequilibrium.
We now assume that both economies experience an increase in 
the exchange demand for loanable funds. The demand curve in 
both economies shifts to the right from D1 to D2 in Figures 
9.2 and 10.2 respectively. In the 100% reserve system, the 
increased demand for loanable funds will increase from Q1 to 
Q 2 . This merely represents a shift of funds from 
consumption to investment. There may be some disruption of 
the economy as it begins to create more capital relative to 
consumption goods but this is unavoidable. This is the best 
and least disruptive method for the economy to respond to an 
increase in demand for loanable funds. All loans extended 
during this period will be, ceteris paribus, profitable if 
it is assumed that this is a permanent shift in time 
preferences, and consequently a permanent shift in the 
demand for loanable funds. The real interest rate at which 
these new loans are extended will be higher or equal to the
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real interest rate at which the economy finally 
equilibrates, and therefore profitable. It is only when 
lending institutions extend credit at below the market rate 
of interest that the loans are eventually seen to be 
unprofitable.
In Fig. 10.2 the fractional reserve free banking economy 
experiences the same shift in demand for loanable funds.
This increase in the exchange demand for loanable funds does 
not imply a decrease in velocity (hoarding) that we will 
next consider. It merely implies that borrowers are now 
willing to accept loanable funds at a higher rate of 
interest. According to Selgin's system, if there is no 
change in the demand for bank reserves, no new credit can be 
extended by fractional reserve institutions. The increased 
demand for loanable funds will be matched by an increase in 
supply from non-bank sources. A fractional reserve banking 
system can do little to respond to changes in the exchange 
demand for loanable funds.
But what of an increase in the reservation demand for money 
itself? Selgin claims this is the area with which 
fractional reserve is best suited to deal. While it is true 
that an increase in the reservation demand for money itself 
(what is commonly referred to as hoarding, and by Selgin 
more accurately as a decrease in velocity) will be
deflationary and disruptive, fractional reserve would 
actually be worse. First of all, under 100 percent reserve 
it is doubtful that a large deflation would take place for 
that would imply that large sums of money are not employed 
for either consumption or investment but merely hoarded or 
destroyed. Historically, the large deflations of the past 
(as in the 1930's) were a result of previous credit 
expansions. One could more plausibly argue that to 
eliminate the disruptive effects of deflation, fractional 
reserve banking should be abolished rather than advocating 
increased fractional reserve credit expansion during 
deflation. But even granting a large deflation under a 100 
percent system, one must consider how such a thing could 
come about. Why would a large proportion of individuals 
desire to hoard money instead of consuming or investing it?
If it was because of uncertainty about the future, then
hoarding may be a wise policy.
Under fractional reserve free banking an increase in the 
reservation demand would result in a decrease in velocity 
and an increase in the bank demand to hold reserves. Selgin 
writes,
As our earlier discussion made clear, a 
free banking system tends to accommodate 
changes in the demand for inside money with
equal changes in its supply. An increase
in the demand for inside money balances 
results in banks' discovering that their 
formerly optimal reserve holdings have become 
superoptimal the banks are encouraged to
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expand their issues of inside money. Con­
versely, a fall in the demand for inside 
money exposes banks to a greater risk of 
default at the clearinghouse, prompting 
balance-sheet contraction. In both cases 
the system avoids unjustified fluctuations 
in aggregate nominal income and prices. [61]
Consequently the banks could increase credit because their 
reserves would increase. Even granting Selgin the fact that 
individuals would keep their increased hoards at fractional 
reserve institutions rather than redeeming them, one must 
question the wisdom of extending credit at such a time. As 
was said before, if a large number of individuals have 
increased hoards because of uncertainty, there may be good 
reasons for their actions. The disruption of deflation 
under 100 percent reserve would probably be minor compared 
to a major increase of unwise and ultimately unprofitable 
malinvestments.
11. Conclusion
Selgin contends that, "Free banks maintain constant the 
supply of inside money multiplied by its income velocity of 
circulation. They are credit intermediaries only, and cause 
no true inflation, deflation or forced savings."[62] This 
view differs markedly from the writings of Mises and 
Rothbard who contend that any credit expansion leads to the 
business cycle. According to Mises, "Issuance of fiduciary
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media, no matter what its quantity may be, always sets in 
motion those changes in the price structure the description 
of which is the task of the theory of the trade cycle. Of 
course, if the additional amount issued is not large, 
neither are the inevitable effects of the expansion."[63]
The Theory of Free Banking rests firmly upon the assumption 
that long run equilibrium can be achieved and maintained 
under fractional reserve free banking. Once this fallacious 
assumption is accepted, Selgin's analysis logically and 
correctly follows. As has been shown, however, equilibrium 
cannot be achieved under fractional reserve but only under 
100 percent reserve. As evidence of this, the introduction 
of fractional reserve banking into a 100 percent reserve 
system in long run equilibrium would still generate a credit 
expansion. Excess reserves in 100 percent deposit banks 
making the transition to fractional reserve banking, would 
be loaned out even if in long run equilibrium and force the 
economy away from this point, requiring a later correction. 
It is this fact that destroys the analysis of the fractional 
reserve theorists.
This is unfortunate, for most of The Theory of Free Banking 
is well written and clearly shows the superiority of free 
banking over centralized banking. What is necessary now is 
for theorists to base their work upon realistic assumptions
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and show the superiority of 100 percent banking over all 
other forms.
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PART FOUR
THE FUTURE WITHOUT FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING
12. Failure of the Present System
The central assertion of this thesis has been to question 
the widely held assumption that the present economic system 
is fundamentally sound and viable in the long run. This 
status quo in which the government is committed to 
continuing credit expansion (with periodic minor 
contractions) is little more than twenty years old and 
without historical precedent, yet few have asked the most 
basic question: does it work in the long run? Does it not 
seem incredible that so many can assume continuous credit 
expansion without some drastic response by market forces?
To say that the banking system is actually supplying this 
credit is misleading, for without new reserves (which are 
determined by the government), the banking system could not 
expand credit. Because the federal government insures this 
credit (much of which is extended below the real interest 
rate) the government is, in fact, the ultimate creditor of 
this debt. Other creditors will gradually shift their funds 
out of investment and into consumption, leaving the 
government with an increasing percentage of total credit 
extended. In essence, this is a unique situation in which
the costs to one producer (the government) of supplying a 
good (credit) are lower than that of any of its competitors, 
for this good can be created virtually out of thin air while 
others must forego consumption. As Dr. Hans-Hermann Hoppe 
writes, "Placed at a lowered interest rate, the newly 
granted credit causes increased investments and initially 
creates a boom that cannot be distinguished from an economic 
expansion; however this boom must turn bust because the 
credit that stimulated it does not represent real savings 
but instead was created out of thin air."[64]
In addition, this credit will be extended regardless of 
whether or not it is ultimately profitable. The problem is 
not as severe when government insures a small percentage of 
total debt. Periodic recessions (which involve a fall in 
capital goods inflated during the previous booms, relative 
to consumer goods), hurt creditors who have extended credit 
secured to inflated capital values. Non-government 
creditors will be hurt most since they hold most of the 
debt. In the latter stages of our present system, however, 
a fall in capital values will degrade the debt portfolio of 
the entire governmentally insured credit system, and the 
government will have to guarantee those capital assets at 
their original inflated prices when credit secured by those 
capital assets was extended. This is why (as was shown in 
Part II) much of the debt extended by governmentally insured
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fractional reserve institutions must ultimately be purchased 
by that same government. This is the real cause of the 
present Savings and Loan bailout and must spread to other 
fractional reserve institutions insured by the federal 
government as well. As long as government continues to 
expand credit, the problem will worsen until it is faced 
with only two equally unappealing choices: allow the 
bankrupt fractional reserve credit system to collapse or 
hyperinflate the currency which will ultimately lead to the 
collapse of the banking system anyway.
Under the gold standard, falling capital values forced 
fractional reserve institutions to contract credit in order 
to remain solvent. This often led (though not always) to a 
rapid contraction of the money supply and deflation which is 
often cited as the main reason to abandon the gold standard. 
While this did remove the possibility of a massive 
deflation, it did nothing to lessen the dire effects of the 
boom-bust cycle. In reality, abandoning the gold standard 
has postponed the inevitable market response to credit 
expansion and greatly magnified its consequences.
13. System Transition
This thesis has questioned the long term viability of any 
fractional reserve system. The conclusion is that any
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system, and especially the present one is doomed to 
inevitable collapse. But isn’t there anything that can be 
done? Can't the government do anything to forestall the 
inevitable?
The answer is that the government will most probably do 
whatever it can to postpone the crisis. By lowering the 
rate of interest through accelerated credit expansion, it 
can postpone the crisis; it cannot prevent it. This action, 
however, will only delay and in fact ultimately exacerbate 
the problems generated by previous credit expansions.
But what will this crisis look like? Can anything be said 
about its nature or approximate time of arrival? This 
future crisis can only be averted by halting credit 
expansion now which in itself would cause a crisis. The 
only advantage would be that a present crisis would not be 
as devastating as one in the future. This is so politically 
unrealistic, however, that it is hardly worth discussing.
In the present political and intellectual climate, credit 
expansion will be halted only when it is clear that there is 
no other alternative.
If one agrees that the government will continue to follow 
the present course of continuous credit expansion punctuated 
by brief reductions in the supply of high powered money, or
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merely reduce the rate of money growth, then certain events 
must occur. First, as was discussed earlier, increasing 
government credit expansion will continue to drive credit, 
financed from non-bank sources, off the market and into 
consumption. Later, inflation will degrade the debt 
portfolios of both fractional reserve and non-bank debt; 
however, since non-bank reserve debt comprises a greater 
percentage of total credit, it will be affected to a greater 
degree. As time passes and fractional reserve debt 
comprises the greater percentage of total debt extended, 
this process will be reversed. Since most fractional 
reserve debt is extended at below market rates of interest, 
this debt will ultimately prove to be unprofitable requiring 
the federal government (the ultimate guarantor) to assume 
this debt.
There will be two ways in which the federal government will 
assume this debt. First of all, through open market 
operations the government will purchase debt outright, 
(usually government bonds) providing liquidity to the 
banking industry. Second, it will actually assume control 
of problem loans, guaranteeing depositors the full value of 
their deposits. This is in effect, purchasing "bad loans" 
at their original, inflated value when the loan was first 
extended. One might argue that this will not necessarily 
produce a crisis since the government is simply purchasing
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debt that it previously created. In the process, government 
is dramatically increasing the supply of money and will be 
limited by the extent to which it is able to contract. The 
"brakes" are wearing thin while the vehicle "accelerates".
If history is any indication of how the market will respond
to this credit expansion, it is likely that the crisis will
be rapid and violent. When inflation rises to the point
where it is no longer profitable to leave deposits in
fractional reserve institutions for even short periods of
time, massive with-drawals will occur, leading to a banking
crisis. But what will be the catalyst of this massive
withdrawal? Why will the present, general confidence in the
banking system erode? It depends on the expectations of
individuals in the economy. Mises writes,
This first stage of the inflationary pro­
cess may last for many years. While it 
lasts, the prices of many goods and services 
are not yet adjusted to the altered money 
relation. There are still people in the 
country who have not yet become aware of 
the fact that they are confronted with a 
price revolution which will finally result 
in a considerable rise of all prices, although 
the extent of this rise will not be the same 
in the various commodities and services. These 
people still believe that prices one day will 
drop. Waiting for this day, they restrict 
their purchases and concomitantly increase 
their cash holding. As long as such ideas 
are still held by public opinion, it is not 
yet too late for the government to abandon its 
inflationary policy.
But then finally the masses wake up. They 
become suddenly aware of the fact that in­
flation is a deliberate policy and will go on
82
endlessly. A breakdown occurs. The crack-up 
boom appears. Everybody is anxious to swap 
his money against "real" goods, no matter 
whether he needs them or not, no matter how 
much money he has to pay for them. Within a 
very short time, within a few weeks or even 
days, the things which were used as money 
are no longer used as media of exchange.
They become scrap paper. Nobody wants to give 
away anything against them.
It was this that happened with the Continental 
currency in America in 1781, with the French 
mandats territoriaux in 1796, and with the 
German Mark in 1923. It will happen again 
whenever the same conditions appear. If a 
thing has to be used as a medium of exchange, 
public opinion must not believe that the 
quantity of this thing will increase beyond all 
bounds. Inflation is a policy that cannot 
last. [65]
In the past, most mainstream economists assumed that there 
were no fundamental problems with the present economic 
system and periodic recessions could be dealt with by "fine- 
tuning". The previous discussion shows, however, that in 
order to "save" the system the government must ultimately 
destroy it.
14. Policy Proposals
The consequences of the collapse of the present system are 
grim indeed. But what will follow the present system if the 
events outlined in this thesis actually occur? Policy 
prescriptions that appeared successful during the Great 
Depression will fail if the present system collapses. The
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federal government cannot borrow to finance public works 
programs in the absence of credit markets. Little can be 
collected in taxes with a worthless currency and the world 
in the depths of history's worst depression. Contraction of 
the money supply cannot be held as the scapegoat when the 
money supply had been inflated into absurdity.
I personally feel that most individuals and even economists
will be forced to turn to the gold standard to reestablish
confidence in the currency. As Mark Skousen writes, "I do
not think that a gold standard will be reestablished on its
own. No doubt such an event would create a crisis. But if
a fiat dollar monetary crisis is already happening, a return
to gold may actually reestablish economic stability."[66]
Dr. Rothbard has already outlined a plan for returning to a
100 percent gold dollar.[67] Along with the introduction of
a 100 percent gold dollar, a 100 percent reserve banking
system nught also become a popular proposal, forever
eliminating the business cycle, inflation and banking
crises. As Dr. Hoppe writes,
The present economic order is characterized 
by national monies instead of one universal 
money; by fiat money instead of a commodity 
such as gold; by monopolistic central banking 
instead of free banking; and by permanent bank 
fraud, and steadily repeated income and wealth 
redistribution, permanent inflation and recur­
ring business cycles as its economic counterparts, 
rather than 100 percent reserve banking with 
none of these consequences.[68]
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This inevitable future tragedy may be the catalyst to 
finally establish an economic base which will encourage 
economic growth and individual freedom. This may provide a 
unique opportunity to the Austrian school. Austrian policy 
proposals once thought unrealistic might be seen as the only 
rational course during a crisis. Although it is impossible 
to predict the timing and exact description of future 
events, it is still possible to describe the general 
sequence of the inevitable consequences of credit expansion. 
Were the Austrian school to concentrate on describing this 
sequence and warning of the dire consequences, its 
credibility would be greatly enhanced.
The collapse of communism has surprised many Austrians even 
though Mises illustrated its fundamental flaws many years 
ago in Socialism. It is not that his ideas were not 
generally accepted within the school, but more a lack of 
confidence in the overwhelming power that the Austrian 
school has to offer. Consequently, had Austrians emphasized 
the present crisis in communism in the past when it was not 
as obvious, credibility in other areas might have been 
strengthened. If there is a crisis coming in the present 
system, Austrians should concentrate their efforts on 
describing events as accurately as possible, thereby 
generating popular support for policy proposals that will 
shorten the length of the crisis and limit the extent of the
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problems. A return to the gold standard in the midst of 
hyperinflation may not only become politically possible, but 
inevitable.
15. Conclusion
This thesis has basically asked just one question: Is the
present economic system fundamentally sound and viable in 
the long run? The foundation of the present system rests 
upon fractional reserve banking and governmentally 
controlled credit expansion. Historically the market has 
always reacted violently to credit expansion resulting in 
bank runs, stock market crashes, recessions, depressions 
and, (as in the case of Bretton Woods) collapse of the 
system itself. Most economists feel that these violent 
episodes can be dealt with and circumvented, even though the 
present system is little more than twenty years old. In the 
long run, market forces cannot be circumvented, especially 
if one defines this nebulous term in decades rather than 
years. Isn't it then reasonable to question the long term 
viability of our present system?
The idea of fractional reserve, when analyzed objectively, 
is truly illogical. In essence, fractional reserve allows 
two parties full and exclusive ownership of the same asset
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over the same time period. To base a financial structure 
upon this concept is asking for trouble. The fact that the 
system has existed for so long can be attributed to off­
setting factors and the fact the inevitable consequences 
have yet to be seen.
Using the Angel Gabriel model, I attempted to illustrate the 
future course of the present system and show that fractional 
reserve free banking is at best a poor second choice to 100 
percent reserve banking. Using the historical record to 
support fractional reserve free banking is at best incon­
clusive, for it is difficult to find examples of the pure 
model and free banking theorists say little about macro­
stability of the economy at large. In addition, credit 
expansion in an advanced capitalist economy would be much 
more disruptive than in an agrarian society where most 
capital is close to consumption. Advocating fractional 
reserve free banking as an alternative to our present system 
could be dangerous, for its failure would be seen as an 
indictment of the free market, rather than the failure of a 
fundamentally flawed system.
When the collapse finally arrives, we will be faced with two 
broad choices. If the collapse is seen as a failure of 
capitalism and free enterprise, policy proposals may call 
for more pervasive government intervention. In this case
the world may be entering a new dark age. If the collapse 
is seen as a failed program of government intervention that 
was ultimately doomed from its inception, then there is hope 
for a transition to a more rational and viable system. The 
return to a 100 percent gold currency and banking system is 
crucial to this new system. Any transition will be painful, 
but the less government interferes, the less painful that 
transition will be. It is up to the supporters of the free 
market to somehow make the simple truth known, for the 
future holds no other alternatives.
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